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ABSTRACT: Bremsstrahlung gamma radiation and photoneutrons are produced during the operation of high energy linear
accelerators. The functionality of electronic devices that are placed inside accelerator tunnels can be jeopardized because
of the negative influence of generated radiation. Therefore, a radiation monitoring system able to gauge neutron fluence
and gamma dose in real time was constructed. Radiation-sensitive dosimeters cooperate with a readout system. The
readout continuously measures both types of radiation and sends quantified data to a main computer. The system is also
placed in the tunnel, hence it must be insensitive to radiation or able to tolerate induced malfunctions. A few different
readout systems were designed. This work presents the application of different readouts designed using commercial of
the shelf (COTS) components. The presented hardware was tested with americium-beryllium neutron source. Finally, the
systems were irradiated in a linear accelerator tunnel to estimate their immunity and suitability for a long-term reliable
operation in the radioactive field.
INTRODUCTION
Electronic control systems of the Free Electron Laser at
Hamburg (FLASH), that is also known as VUV-FEL, are
installed inside its tunnel [1]. The laser is driven by a
1.2 GeV linear accelerator, therefore radiation generated
during FLASH operation can pose a real threat to elec-
tronic systems and subsystems [2, 3, 4]. Ionizing radi-
ation continuously damages electronic components be-
cause of the total ionizing dose (TID) effect [5, 6]. Non-
ionizing particles are responsible for displacement dam-
age [7, 8]. Moreover, neutrons can affect components by
single event effects (SEEs), in particular single event up-
sets (SEUs) [9, 10, 7, 8, 6]. Therefore, it is advisable to
monitor radiation produced in the FLASH tunnel in real
time to estimate the danger and their life time. Moreover,
a radiation monitoring system may help to minimize neu-
tron fluence and gamma radiation dose generated during
the FLASH operation.
High-density FPGA circuits were employed to design a
dedicated digital control system of the FLASH laser to
obtain a high stability of the amplitude and phase of RF
field supplying accelerating modules [11]. An exemplary
board of the control system is illustrated in Figure 1. The
presented digital system is mainly based on Xilinx Vir-
tex II pro and thus may be sensitive to SEUs [12, 13].
The device communicates with an external SUN com-
puter using a VME interface. Indeed, processing data
are stored in dynamic and static random access mem-
ories (DRAMs, SRAMs) that can be also sensible to
SEUs [14, 14, 15, 16]. Therefore, a monitoring of both
types of radiation may be very useful especially in the ini-
tial phase of the FLASH development. Moreover, knowl-
edge concerning the amount of generated upsets in a
calibrated sensing memory may be utilized to estimate
Fig. 1. An exemplary FPGA–based control board SimCon 3.1L
vulnerability of the used electronic components to neu-
trons present in the accelerator tunnel. Silicon dosime-
ters are the most suitable sensors for radiation monitor-
ing system because damage of the FLASH electronics
are going to be correlated with gauged radiation doses.
A SRAM-based dosimeter was designed and calibrated
to quantify neutron fluence and SEUs induced in elec-
tronics [17, 18]. It has been proved that the number of in-
duced SEUs in SRAM is proportional to neutron fluence.
A RadFET dosimeter was applied to measure ionizing
doses. The system equipped with the radiation-tolerant
readout is called RadMon. A few various digital read-
out systems were designed to carry out irradiation ex-
periments and emerge the most suitable radiation-tolerant
device to compose a distributed system. Such a monitor
allows to quantify neutron fluence and gamma dose in a
few different places in FLASH. The block diagram of a
four-channel monitoring system is depicted in figure 2.
Further, the system is going to be installed in a much
higher number of places in the next version of FLASH
Fig. 2. The block diagram of a distributed radiation
monitoring system
Fig. 3. A block diagram of the RadMon device
laser, thus the construction of the readout should be cost-
effective.
A REVIEW OF RADIATION-TOLERANT
READOUT SYSTEMS
Various solutions were taken into consideration to design
the readout system. The usage of Rad–Hard devices re-
sults in a dramatical increase of designing costs, therefore
they are not good candidates for such a system. Finally,
commercial of the shelf (COTS) components were cho-
sen despite their vulnerability to radiation. Therefore, the
electronic readout must be designed in such a way that
it can tolerate malfunctions caused by radiation. In ad-
dition, gamma radiation and neutron displacement dam-
age can be further reduced by the application of suitable
shielding.
The application of redundancy to design
RadMon readout
A modular redundancy was used to enable a faultless op-
eration of the RadMon in the accelerator tunnel. Never-
theless, the memory is continuously reading short inter-
ruptions of the read-out system that are acceptable [19].
Therefore, a double modular redundancy (DMR) was
used to protect the system against SEUs [20, 21]. The ad-
vantage of DMR is the low excess of hardware in compar-
ison to other hardening methods, e.g. triple modular re-
dundancy (TMR). The schematic diagram of the designed
system is presented in figure 3. Two identical microcon-
trollers handle the SRAM device. The signals generated
by microcontrollers are connected to a data comparator.
A interrupt is generated when the comparator detects an
inconsistency. Then, microcontrollers send information
to a PC and the system is restarted. An additional watch-
dog was applied to assure a reliable operation of the sys-
tem. The PC generates a hard-reset signal and writes
a new pattern into the SRAM device in case of a gen-
eral RadMon’s failure that is not corrected by DRM. The
RadMon device cooperates with a master PC computer,
therefore the device must be able to realize commands
delivered from the PC. During the normal operation, the
system periodically sends “live” frames to the PC. A hard
reset is generated after the power disconnection or when
the “live” frame is not delivered to the PC at the appointed
time. This procedure assures the reliable operation of the
RadMon, even if the system is crushed. The first proto-
type of RadMon (version 1.0) was built with an applica-
tion of two ATMEL’s 8051–family microcontrollers and
a TTL–based control logic. The system was able to su-
pervise a maximum of 128 kB memory supplied from
5 V. The old TTL technology was chosen intentionally,
because is much more resistant to radiation [19]. Highly
advanced, low–voltage devices with reduced feature sizes
are more susceptible to both SEE and TID. The doses of
radiation generated in Linac II were not known, therefore
a robust solution was required to investigate the influence
of radiation as well on the readout as SRAM device.
Two microcontrollers manufactured by Microchip were
used to design the second prototype of RadMon. The sys-
tem, supplied from 3,3 V, is able to handle up to 128 MB
SRAM chip employed as a neutron fluence detector. Mi-
crocontrollers operate synchronously executing the same
program and therefore supply identical control signals to
peripheral devices. However, the scanned memory and
auxiliary devices are controlled only from the master de-
vice (microcontroller 1), see Figure 3. A digital com-
parator based on FPGAs produced by Actel was utilised
as a voter. The digital voter is radiation sensitive, thus
the system will be restarted when neutrons generate SEU
or SET in the main logic. However, the configuration
of the employed FPGA is stored in a FLASH memory
that is much more immune to SEU than SRAM. During
the RadMon operation, additional parameters are mea-
sured: supply current and temperature of the memory.
The measured memory supply current increases because
of the TID effect. Knowledge of memory temperature is
necessary to make an unavoidable temperature correction
of the measured SRAM current. The analysis of mem-
ory and board supply currents provide information about
TID damage effect and dangerous Single Event LatchUps
(SELs) [22]. The device is protected against SEL using
a current limited power supply and polymer-based reset-
table fuses. No SEL was observed in the tested devices
in Linac II and TTF2 tunnels [22].
The first version of the RadMon has a serious disad-
vantage, the maximum operable memory was limited to
128 kB. The whole system was designed in 5 V technol-
ogy, therefore it was possible to connect only 5 V mem-
ories. The one cycle scanning time was below 1 second.
The second device was designed using low voltage cir-
cuits therefore the memory supplied from 2.5 up to 5 V
can be employed with capacities up to 128 MB. The sys-
tem is able to scan memory within 30 s.
Fig. 4. The block diagram of the FPGA-based RadMon
An application of programmable circuits to
design readout system
Field Programmable Gate Array (FPGA) devices are of-
ten used to design digital circuits because of a high speed
of data processing and flexibility. The configuration of a
FPGA circuit is usually stored in a SRAM, hence the de-
vice can be easily and quickly programmed many times.
An application of the FPGAs significantly simplifies the
designing process of electronic circuits.
Indeed, programmable devices can be used to design an
efficient readout for the RadMon system. In addition, the
adaptation of FPGA allows to reduce the scanning time
of the sensing memory and system restarts in case of sin-
gle event functional interrupt SETI. However, the config-
uration SRAM of a programmable circuit can be violated
when exposed to neutrons because of the occurrence of
SEUs. A readout circuit designed with an application
of FPGA should tolerate radiation-provoked errors and
therefore operate reliably in a linear accelerator tunnel.
From the other side, an utilisation of FLASH-based FP-
GAs may eliminate a part of SEU-induced malfunctions.
Nevertheless, single event transients (SETs) can be still
induced in the control logic in both FPGA-type circuits.
The RadMon was implemented in a commercial FPGA to
examine its suitability for the usage in a radiation-tolerant
readout. FLASH–based devices made by ACTEL were
taken into consideration.
*A radiation tolerant readout implemented in FPGA
ACTEL APA 600 programmable circuit was chosen to
construct the fourth version of the RadMon readout. The
device cooperates with a more compact version of four
512 kB stacked memory module [16]. Configuration data
are stored in the internal FLASH memory of ACTEL cir-
cuit that is much more immune to SEUs comparing to
SRAM. The principle of operation is similar to the previ-
ous version of RadMon 2.0. A simplified block diagram
of the FPGA-based reader is presented in figure 4. The
device consists of the main finite state machine (FSM)
responsible for the supervising of all submodules. The
SRAM memory is programmed after the restart. Suitable
information is sent to the main PC computer when the
programming is finished and verified. Then, the contin-
uous scanning process of the memory begins. When an
error or errors are detected the error counter (EC) in in-
creased and corrected data are written into the memory.
The number of detected SEUs is sent to the PC after a
whole scanning cycle. A live frame must be transmit-
ted in the period of time shorter than 10 seconds to avoid
triggering off an external watch-dog. The send data are
Fig. 5. The block diagram of the FPGA-based readout system
of FIFO memory
secured with a 32-bit CRC control sum to avoid trans-
mission errors and to verify the correctness of the reader
operation. The digitalised RadFET’s threshold voltage is
delivered every 10 minutes. *FLASH-based FPGA as a
radiation tolerant readout The fifth version of the readout
system dedicated for supervision of FIFO memory was
also implemented in the ACTEL FPGA. A lower density
programmable circuit APA150 was utilised because of
the simplified construction of the FIFO reader. The block
diagram of the reader is illustrated in figure 5. The reader
uses almost the same submodules as the version 4 of the
RadMon . However, the memory interface is slightly dif-
ferent. The address counter was eliminated. The output
9-bits data bus of the FIFO is connected to a compara-
tor, while logical zeros are delivered to its inputs. The
main FSM generates only write and read signals, which
are shifted in a phase.
A selective TRM was applied to immunize designed read-
ers against neutron provoked SEUs. The FSMs, which
control reader’s operation, i.e. a CRC calculator, a uni-
versal asynchronous receiver transmitter (UART), a se-
rial peripheral interface (SPI), a address generator and the
main control circuit, are the most crucial elements of the
system, because of the radiation immunity. Circuits were
implemented under a Libero IDE with a Synplify syn-
thesiser. The Synplify can generate three types of state
machines one-hot, gray and sequential. Even though the
synthesiser produces a highly optimal final implementa-
tion of FSMs that were immunised using TRM, their ap-
plication in circuits operating in a harsh radioactive envi-
ronment cannot be acceptable. Synplify optimizes away
all transition states and logics that cannot be reached to
enhance both a speed and circuit area. However, FSM can
be obstructed in the invalid state when a SEU is induced
in the FPGA structure. Therefore, the FSM has to be de-
signed in such a way to enable transitions from all invalid
states into the defined safe state. All type of FSMs can
be employed to jump into the reset state in case of a soft
error, while a self-defined sequential machine must be ap-
plied to jump into other safe state, while the invalid state
is reached. Parameters of the employed FSMs are sum-
marized in table 1. One can notice that the total number
of states for the onehot FSM is much higher than usable
states. A onehot machine is very efficient with regards
to both occupied resources and speed. Nevertheless, this
type of FSM is suitable to low number of states’ applica-
tions. All FSMs in the presented readers were equipped
with a reset logic for illegal states.
TABLE 1. The summary of the readout FSMs

















Fig. 6. A standard flip-flop with an asynchronous reset and
preset that was modified using TMR
A Synplify synthesiser was applied to implement selec-
tive and conventional TRMs. Firstly, a standard descrip-
tion of the readout was prepared using a Vhsic Figure de-
scription language (VHDL). The synthesis was then exe-
cuted, however input-output cells were not implemented.
A piece of software was written to substitute automati-
cally a collection of flip-flop primitives with their tripled
versions equipped with voting circuits. Moreover, the
software allows applying the redundancy of desired se-
lectively chosen submodules. The exemplary modified
D-type filp-flop is depicted in figure 6. The circuit was
ready for a final synthesis when the substitution process
was finished. The amount of required resources was in-
creased significantly after the synthesis depending on the
used redundancy method.
The comparison of the consumed FPGA resources is pre-
sented in table 2 1. The amount of used storage elements
was increased 2.9 times when the TRM was utilized. The
usage of selective triple modular redundancy (STRM) al-
lows to save some FPGA resources, the factor was equal
to 2.7. Additional combinational primitives were also
required for voters. Moreover, the readout of the FIFO
memory was simplified comparing to the RadMon 4. In
particular, the number of required input-output pins was
smaller and therefore a lower density FPGA APA 150
was used. Almost three times more flip-flops were re-
quired when TRM was employed. The RadMon 5 may
be further simplified when a dedicated memory will be
1An APA150 programmable circuit was used to design the read-
out dedicated for a FIFO memory, while the standard SRAM version
employed APA600 device. Hence, the RadMon supervising the FIFO
memory was synthesised intentionally for larger APA600 FPGA to fa-
cilitate their comparison
TABLE 3. Restarts of the RadMon 2 devices


















used, the IDT FIFO memory needs a lot of connections
to enable its initialisation. The desired memory may only
have three control signals read, write and reset (not count-
ing data buses), see figure 5.
*IRRADIATION TESTS OF DIFFERENT RADMON
READER VERSIONS
Designed readers were subjected to radiation during ex-
periments with an application of different memories. The
devices were irradiated with americium-beryllium neu-
tron source and inside Linac II and FLASH tunnels. Dur-
ing sensitivity tests with 241AmBe no significant mal-
functions were observed. The devices, similarly to sens-
ing SRAMs, were placed in the nearest proximity of the
neutron source. All above mentioned systems were able
to read the memories and therefore supply numbers of
induced SEUs.
However, short interruptions in the RadMons’ operations
were observed when the devices were irradiated in accel-
erator tunnels. It should be emphasised that DRM does
not allow to maintain the correct operation of a system
when an error is induced in critical module. Therefore,
registered restarts of systems were necessary to enable a
correct measurement of SEUs in the RadMons’ sensing
memory.
Three systems, based on RadMon 2 readouts, were
equipped with different memories and placed in FLASH
tunnel for two months. The registered malfunctions of
the systems are gathered in table 3. The systems were in-
stalled opposite the accelerating module AAC1 approxi-
mately 20 cm form the concrete wall. Most of the failures
of readouts were detected by comparators and eliminated
by restarts of the systems. However, data measured by
RadMon 2.2 were not send to PC computer after 1219
hours of operation. The PC computer had to generate a
reset signal after 150 s to revive the system. However,
exact details of the failure are not known. The history
of the next three-month operation of RadMon 2.0, that
supervised 2 MB memory sensor and gauged neutron flu-
ence and gamma radiation in the FLASH tunnel is de-
picted in table 4. The RadMon 2.0 operates reliably even
if a few desynchronisations occurred. No other problems
were detected. RadMon 4 and RadMon 5 devices were
installed in FLASH tunnel at the same time. The read-
out systems of RadMon 4 and RadMon 5 were operating
much better than RadMon 2. No radiation-caused system
restarts were recorded. The neutron fluence quantified
by RadMon 4 was comparable with the fluence gauged
TABLE 2. The comparison of occupied FPGA-resources of various RadMon reader versions
Device version FPGA resources Tiles GatesCore cells I/O pads Logic Storage Logic Storage
Readout system of a 32-bit SRAM device based on APA600 FPGA
RadMon 4 12.6 % 37.2 % 2158 559 4387 4328
RadMon 4-TRM 22.3 % 37.2 % 3188 1599 6375 12369
RadMon 4-STRM 21.7 % 37.2 % 3126 1537 6251 11873
Readout system of a FIFO memory based on APA150 FPGA
RadMon 5 11.1 % 26.9 % 1938 495 3853 3813
RadMon 5-TRM 20.1 % 26.9 % 2926 1452 5836 11178
TABLE 4. Restarts of the RadMon 2 devices


















by RadMon 2.0. The system cooperating with a FIFO
memory does not measure any SEUs. The memory was
insensitive to neutrons during sensitivity tests. However,
the system does not demonstrated any faultiness.
CONCLUSIONS
The application of COTS elements allows to design a
reliable and cost-effective readout for RadMon moni-
toring system. A few different versions of the system
were built and tested. Performed tests show that both
microcontroller- and FPGA-based systems are able to op-
erate correctly when subjected to neutron influence from
americium-beryllium. However, a long-term irradiation
in the target environment of the linac driving the FLASH
laser reveals the advantage of FPGA-based system over
the microcontroller version. The FPGA-based readout
allows to scan the sensing memory incomparably faster.
The parallel nature of the FPGA circuit allows to super-
vise a few SRAM chips at the same time. Moreover,
the scanning time can be further shortened when more
SRAMs will be used. However, an application of dis-
tributed sensor that is composed of many SRAMs nega-
tively increase its sensitive volume (SV). From the other
side, the usage of a parallel memory allows to enhance
the entire sensitivity of the sensor.
Restarts of the RadMon 2.0 were unavoidable to guaran-
tee a reliable operation when the desynchronisation was
detected. Such a behaviour of the readout can be toler-
ated during a normal operation assuming that the restarts
occurs adequately sparsely. The external watch-dog was
activated only once when the microcontroller-based sys-
tem did not send any frame.
Data transmitted from all RadMon systems were not
stored in the data base when the computer network was
damaged. Therefore, a dedicated bus is required to en-
hance the reliability of the distributed system and mea-
surement of radiation doses.
An employment of FPGA devices shortens the full cycle
scanning time below 100 ms. The scanning time is crucial
in case of the usage of the monitoring system to trigger
an alarm signal when radiation level increases consider-
ably. The response time is much more important than the
sensitivity of the monitor for such an application.
The tested FIFO memory was insensitive to the neutron
influence during sensitivity tests, hence it cannot be used
for radiation detection. However, the application of FIFO
memory can simplify the construction of the readout sys-
tem and the detector. Concluding, a radiation-sensitive
FIFO may be an ideal candidate for the neutron fluence
detector.
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